Just like the nature of envy, the value of envy is part of ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology, while the debates proceeded largely independent of each other. In philosophy, most contributions, historical and contemporary, have argued that envy is morally bad (e.g., Aristotle 1925; Roberts 1991; D’Arms and Kerr 2008), even though it may be a fitting response to a situation (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). Most of the philosophical approaches have thus relied on a conceptualization of envy as primarily malicious. When they have considered the possibility of multiple ways of conceptualizing envy and its variables, they have done so by overlooking relevant empirical evidence, and arguing that non-malicious forms of envy count as envy only superficially (Taylor 2006).

A few authors have noticed that envy is not always related to harming intentions. They have argued that envy is potentially morally neutral (Ben-Ze’ev 2002), excusable (Bankovsky 2018), reasonable (Green 2013), or even morally valuable when it concerns envied persons’ undeserved advantages, leads to self-improvement, or addresses social inequalities (La Caze 2001), or because it shows that the envier cares about objects that contribute to a worthwhile life, a key responsibility of a moral agent (Thomason 2015). But even these more envy-friendly perspectives have not consistently or extensively engaged with the empirical literature, often supporting empirical speculations with only anecdotal evidence.

In psychology, similar standpoints on the value of envy exist. Early theoretical approaches conceptualized envy as an emotion that is constituted by hostility and ill-will, which stem from comparative inferiority for which the envied person is not necessarily responsible (Smith and Kim 2007). Therefore, envy was classified as detestable (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007). When research on benign and malicious envy emerged, a common criticism was that the two envy forms simply tease apart the constructive and destructive outcomes of envy (Cohen-Charash and Larson 2017). Specifically, the criticism was that benign envy includes only constructive outcomes and is therefore socially desirable and easily admitted to others. In contrast, malicious envy includes only destructive outcomes and is therefore socially undesirable and usually disguised. However, other research shows that benign envy can foster socially undesirable outcomes such as Machiavellian intentions (Lange et al. 2018b) or overconsumption (Belk 2011) and that malicious envy can foster socially desirable outcomes such as outcome-focused goal pursuit (Salerno et al. 2019) or social punishment of arrogant high-achievers (Lange and Boecker 2019). In light of these findings, research in psychology now largely recommends refraining from value judgments about envy (Crusius et al. 2020). Yet, much like a philosophical approach is limited which engages only superficially with empirical evidence, so is a psychological approach which refrains from a thoughtful value assessment.

In sum, even though the debates in philosophy and psychology contributed to research on the value of envy, they are also limited. On the one hand, the debate in philosophy has been informed by sophisticated standards on which to evaluate the value of envy, yet it has lacked empirically grounded research. On the other hand, the debate in psychology has been informed by empirically grounded research, yet it has lacked sophisticated standards on which to evaluate the value of envy. Combining strengths of both approaches can consequentially illuminate the discussion. To achieve this goal, we need to discuss different dimensions on which to judge the value of envy.

The empirically derived functional approach to envy emphasizes that it may primarily help the individual to solve intrapersonal and interpersonal tasks. More specifically, the components of envy are instrumental in triggering certain outcomes that contribute to the envier’s well-being and social relationships. For instance, it may not be helpful to just desire the envy object (e.g., a possession), but this desire can spur various behaviors directed at obtaining the envy object (e.g., buying the possession) and thereby be functional for alleviating the painful inferiority the envier experiences.

In light of envy’s functionality, it may seem straightforward to evaluate envy as instrumentally valuable, but the matter is more complicated for two reasons. First, even though evidence supports the conclusion that envy can be functional under certain conditions, its outcomes may sometimes turn out to be dysfunctional. That is, just because envy predicts efforts to regulate the envier’s social status, this is not to say that all these efforts will always be successful. Therefore, the conditions that can render envy and its outcomes instrumentally good need to be investigated systematically. Relatedly, just because envy will often be functional, this is not to say that all value of envy boils down to instrumental value. Functional benefits are just one facet of the overall experience of envy. Hence, it is certainly possible that envy also has non-instrumental value, which we here define as being valuable for its own sake.

Second, we need to ask: envy is instrumentally valuable to whom? What is valuable to an individual’s well-being can be detrimental to the well-being of someone else who is affected by the individual’s actions, or by the community as a whole. An evil torturer who feels benign envy toward a more experienced torturer will be motivated to improve their torture skills. According to an amoral perspective which refrains from talking about value, we should say that this kind of envy, which motivates the envier to become better at their job, and thus to ascend in the social hierarchy (e.g., the person gets promoted and allowed to torture more prisoners), is accompanied by a boost in self-esteem and causes a genuine improvement in their material and emotional well-being. But this is a horrific thing to say.

There are at least two dimensions we need to take into account. Specifically, we assume a widely-shared distinction between prudential and moral value. A classical way of making the distinction derives from Henry Sidgwick’s contrast between rational prudence, which aims at one’s personal well-being, and rational benevolence, which takes into account the good of everyone else as much as one’s own. Moral badness and goodness, in this picture, are assessed from “the point of view […] of the universe” (Sidgwick 1967; p.382).

This distinction holds beyond rationalist approaches to ethics and can be found in some form or another in very different philosophical traditions. For instance, the sentimentalist David Hume draws a similar distinction between prudence and morality when he writes: “I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character” (Hume 1969).

Such a conceptual distinction is maintained even in frameworks where prudence is extensionally conceived of as a subset of morality. For instance, contemporary virtue ethicists would argue that, for the virtuous agent, if something is morally bad, then it is also prudentially bad (e.g., McDowell 1979; Hursthouse 1999). But even for such theories, distinguishing between the prudential and moral value of envy is possible, and crucial for coping with envy productively.

Prudential and moral value evidently come apart in the torturer case. The torturer’s personal well-being might improve, but the well-being of the victims clearly decreases. Such a distinction may also occur in envy. Therefore, when considering the value of envy, we need to distinguish between prudential and moral value as well as instrumental and non-instrumental value.

We propose to consider the value of envy alongside multiple pathways a person can take. Depending on which dimensions of value one considers and under which conditions one looks at envy and its consequences, the evaluation of envy will change. The structure depicted in Fig. 1 metaphorically represents the possible pathways that lead to different evaluations of envy. Hence, a multi-componential, functional account of envy allows deriving a nuanced perspective on the value of envy.

The pathways of envy that have different value. Pathways that end in dark grey corners represent exemplary outcomes of benign envy and pathways that end in light grey corners represent exemplary outcomes of malicious envy

Along the first pathway, the functional approach to envy predicts that envy may have instrumental value, insofar as it brings about specific outcomes that a person would evaluate to be good in one of three ways. First, envy may have both prudential and moral instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it relates to improvement motivation (Lange et al. 2018c), which may translate into actual improvement (Lange and Crusius 2015b). Such benignly envious efforts correlate with higher well-being of enviers and increases in flourishing over time (Briki 2019; Ng et al. 2020). Hence, improvement motivation may have instrumental value for the person because it promotes outcomes that are prudentially good. Moreover, when people acquire skills, this allows them to invest these skills into society, for instance in prestige hierarchies (Henrich and Gil-White 2001). Finally, when benign envy is felt with regard to morally good traits and qualities, the envier’s improvement is not only prudentially good, but also valuable for others around them. Hence, social groups may benefit from benignly envious individuals in the long term, which means that benign envy may have instrumental moral value.

For malicious envy, evidence indicates that it triggers schadenfreude when arrogant high-achievers fail, changing the public image of these high-achievers and putting them in their place (Lange and Boecker 2019). Because this consequence leads to potentially lasting pleasure for the envier, it is prudentially good (Fletcher 2008). Moreover, arrogant high-achievers are widely disliked and spread fear among subordinates (Cheng et al. 2013; Maner and Case 2016). Therefore, putting such high-achievers in their place may benefit society at large (except for the high-achiever him−/herself) and is accordingly morally good, provided that no other countervailing harm is brought about.

Second, envy may have prudential, but not moral, instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it relates to Machiavellian tendencies such as backstabbing (Lange et al. 2018b). Under certain conditions, these tendencies indeed correlate with higher status, for instance in the workplace (Shultz 1993; Hawley 2003; Lange et al. 2018b). High status, in turn, is a strong predictor of higher well-being (Anderson et al. 2015) rendering the envy-driven Machiavellian tendencies instrumental in achieving a prudentially good outcome. However, Machiavellian tendencies also relate to various antisocial behaviors that lead to interpersonal conflict (Muris et al. 2017). Therefore, under these conditions, the envy-driven Machiavellian tendencies are morally bad.

For malicious envy, there is less evidence in this category. One example may come from studies showing that malicious envy predicts the assignment of rather difficult tasks to an envied person who deservedly outperformed the envier in previous circumstances (Lange and Crusius 2015a). Under the assumption that these more difficult tasks will undermine the envied person’s chances to continue being successful, assigning a more difficult task may—at least in the short-term—increase the envier’s well-being, rendering such efforts instrumental in promoting an outcome that is prudentially good. However, as the envied person earned the success, moral observers should actually experience pleasure for the envied person (Feather 2006). If they instead assign more difficult tasks to these deserving others, doing so is morally bad. Even though the empirical evidence on the prudential benefits of malicious envy may be lacking, it is plausible that there can be several short-term advantages stemming from causing harm to the envied person. If that wasn’t the case, we would expect much fewer cases of cheating, stealing, sabotaging and even murdering, all of which can sometimes be motivated by malicious envy. While these behaviors are socially stigmatized, legally sanctioned, and morally condemned, they do bring prudential benefits at least temporarily. When the envier’s deeds remain undetected and permanently lower the standing of the envied person, it is even imaginable that the prudential benefits last for long periods of time.

Third, envy may have moral, but not prudential, instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it leads to persistence, even when the task at hand is extremely difficult or potentially impossible to solve (Lange and Crusius 2015a). Persistence for impossible tasks will undermine the envier’s well-being, which is prudentially bad. However, general persistence for extremely difficult tasks may produce success that could benefit society (Duckworth et al. 2007), rendering persistence instrumental in fostering morally good outcomes.

For malicious envy, evidence indicates that it triggers outcome-focused (i.e., effort-independent) goal-pursuit (Salerno et al. 2019), potentially motivating enviers to buy other luxury products similar to the kind that made them envious (Van de Ven et al. 2011b). Such alternative purchases fail to close the gap in the exact domain that elicited envy and fail to pull the envied person down. Accordingly, malicious enviers may often remain inferior, potentially explaining why malicious envy relates to lower well-being (Briki 2019; Ng et al. 2020), an outcome that is prudentially bad. However, buying alternative products still propels the economy, which benefits all people in the long-term. Therefore, this goal-pursuit may be instrumental in promoting outcomes that are arguably morally good.

Along a second pathway, envy may have non-instrumental value in that it motivates the envier to pursue some goals for their own sake. Specifically, envy may have non-instrumental prudential and moral value. The central psychological goal underlying both benign and malicious envy is the regulation of social status (e.g., Crusius and Lange 2017). Evidence indicates that benign and malicious envy predict status attainment via different strategies (e.g., Lange et al. 2016; Lange et al. 2018b). Social status has diverse advantages for the self and contributes widely to the structuring and flourishing of society (e.g., Anderson et al. 2015). While this flourishing may be valuable instrumentally, some of it seems to be good for its own sake: it feels good to be the object of social esteem and approbation. Status is thus a thing that people often pursue for their own sake, as a component of their emotional well-being. As envy—at its core—is concerned with the pursuit and attainment of status, we would argue that envy may have prudential and moral non-instrumental value (for a related argument see La Caze 2001; Thomason 2015). From a philosophical perspective, dispositional benign envy, if it motivates to self-improve with regard to objectively valuable objects, may be considered a component of a virtuous character (Protasi 2021) and thus has prudential and moral non-instrumental value.

Along a third pathway, envy predicts outcomes that are prudentially and morally bad, in line with the common portrayal of envy. In this case, envy lacks value. For benign envy, evidence shows that it relates to overconsumption (Belk 2011). Because overconsumption may ruin people financially and also exploit the environment (de Graff et al. 2014), outcomes of overconsumption are prudentially and morally bad (see also Morgan-Knapp 2014). For malicious envy, evidence shows that it relates to psychopathic tendencies such as erratic and criminal behavior (Lange et al. 2018b). The same research indicates that these behaviors fail to translate into status, and, accordingly, fail to advance the envier’s well-being longitudinally. Moreover, psychopathic tendencies generally predict negative long-term social effects (LeBreton et al. 2006) and interpersonal difficulties (Muris et al. 2017). Hence, the outcomes of envy-driven psychopathic behaviors are prudentially and morally bad.

In sum, components and outcomes of envy derived from a functional perspective allow evaluating the value of envy in a more nuanced manner according to different dimensions. Envy may have instrumental value, as it promotes outcomes that are prudentially and morally good, prudentially good but morally bad, or morally good and prudentially bad. Moreover, envy may have non-instrumental value, being prudentially and morally good itself. However, envy is also often prudentially and morally bad. This more elaborate perspective on the value of envy has a number of implications.