Albahari, M. 2006. Analytical uddhism: the two-tiered illusion of self. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Book  Google Scholar 

Alston, W. 1971. Varieties of privileged access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8(3): 223–241.

Google Scholar 

Bermúdez, J. 2019. Bodily ownership, psychological ownership, and psychopathology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10(2): 263–280.

Article  Google Scholar 

Billon, A. 2017. Basic self-awareness. European Journal of Philosophy 25(3): 732–763.

Article  Google Scholar 

Billon, A. 2023. What is it like to lack mineness? Depersonalization as a probe for the scope, nature, and role of mineness. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 314–342. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18(2): 227–247.

Article  Google Scholar 

Boghossian, P. 1989. Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17(1): 5–26.

Article  Google Scholar 

Byrne, A. 2005. Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33(1): 79–104.

Article  Google Scholar 

Carruthers, P. 2011. The opacity of mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Cassam, Q. 2014. Self-knowledge for humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Google Scholar 

Cassam, Q. 2017. What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge. Synthese 194(3): 723–741.

Article  Google Scholar 

Cochrane, T. 2021. A case of shared consciousness. Synthese 199(1): 1019–1037.

Article  Google Scholar 

Davidson, D. 1987. Knowing one’s own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3): 441–458.

Evans, G. 1982. The varieties of reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Google Scholar 

Farrell, J., and T. McClelland. 2017. Editorial: consciousness and inner awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8(1): 1–22.

Article  Google Scholar 

Fernández, J. 2013. Transparent minds: a study of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Fernández, J. 2019. Memory: a self-referential account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Fernández, J. 2023. The ownership of memories. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 343–362. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Frith, C. 1992. The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.

Google Scholar 

Gallagher, S. 2017. Self-defense: deflecting deflationary and eliminativist critiques of the sense of ownership. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1–10.

Article  Google Scholar 

Gallagher, S., and D. Zahavi. 2021. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological.

Gennaro, R. 2022. What is the structure of self-consciousness and conscious mental states? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13(2): 295–309.

Article  Google Scholar 

Gertler, B. 2011. Self-knowledge. New York: Routledge.

Google Scholar 

Guillot, M. 2017. I me mine: on a confusion concerning the subjective character of experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8(1): 23–53.

Article  Google Scholar 

Guillot, M. 2023. The phenomenal concept of self and first-person epistemology. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 223–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Howell, R. 2023a. Transparency and subjective character. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 77–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Howell, R. 2023b. Self-awareness and the elusive subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Howell, R., and B. Thompson. 2017. Phenomenally mine: in search of the subjective character of consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8(1): 103–127.

Article  Google Scholar 

Kang, S. P. 2022. Shared consciousness and asymmetry. Synthese 200(5): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03890-w.

Article  Google Scholar 

Kriegel, U. 2009. Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Kriegel, U. 2023. The three circles of consciousness. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 169–190. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Lawlor, K. 2009. Knowing what one wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 47–75.

Article  Google Scholar 

Letheby, C. 2020. Being for no-one: psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(1): 1–26.

Article  Google Scholar 

Levine, J. 2001. Purple haze: the puzzle of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

McClelland, T. 2023. Four impediments to the case for mineness. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 50–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

McDowell, J. 1982. Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy 68: 455–479.

McKinsey, M. 1991. Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 51(1): 9–16.

Article  Google Scholar 

McNeill, W. 2012. On seeing that someone is angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20(4): 575–597.

Article  Google Scholar 

Millière, R. 2020. The varieties of selflessness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(1): 1–41.

Article  Google Scholar 

Mitchell, J. 2022. The mind’s presence to itself: in search of non-intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104(3): 659–675.

Article  Google Scholar 

Moran, R. 2001. Authority and estrangement: an essay on self-knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Google Scholar 

Musholt, K. 2015. Thinking about oneself: from nonconceptual content to the concept of a self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Neta, R. 2011. The nature and reach of privileged access. In Self-knowledge, ed. A. Hatzimoysis. 9–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Nida-Rümelin, M. 2017. Self-awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8(1): 55–82.

Article  Google Scholar 

Nida-Rümelin, M. 2023. Experiencing subjects and so-called mine-ness. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 191–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

O’Conaill, D. 2019. Subjectivity and mineness. Erkenntnis 84(2): 325–341.

Article  Google Scholar 

O’Conaill, D. 2022. Subjectivity and non-objectifying awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1–21.

Peacocke, C. 1998. Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge. In Knowing our own minds, eds. C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald. 63–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Google Scholar 

Peterson, J. 2021. The value of privileged access. European Journal of Philosophy 29(2): 365–378.

Article  Google Scholar 

Prosser, S., and F. Recanati. eds. 2012. Immunity to error through misidentification: new essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Google Scholar 

Pryor, J. 2014. There is immediate justification. In Contemporary debates in epistemology, eds. M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa. 2nd ed., 202–222. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Google Scholar 

Recanati, F. 2007. Perspectival thought: a plea for (moderate) relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Rowlands, M. 2016. Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness: the adverbial interpretation. In Pre-reflective consciousness: Sartre and contemporary philosophy of mind, eds. S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. Morando. 113–131. London: Routledge.

Google Scholar 

Ryle, G. 2009. The concept of mind (60th anniversary edition). New York: Routledge.

Salje, L., and A. Geddes. 2023. Conscious experience: what’s in it for me? In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 27–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65(19): 555–567.

Article  Google Scholar 

Shoemaker, S. 1994. Self-knowledge and inner sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 249–314.

Article  Google Scholar 

Siegel, S., and N. Silins. 2014. Consciousness, attention, and justification. In Scepticism and perceptual justification, eds. D. Dodd, and E. Zardini. 149–170. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Sierra, M. 2009. Depersonalization: a new look at a neglected syndrome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Smith, J. 2010. Seeing other people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(3): 731–748.

Article  Google Scholar 

Smithies, D. 2012. A simple theory of introspection. In Introspection and consciousness, eds. D. Smithies, and D. Stoljar. 259–293. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Smithies, D. 2019. The epistemic role of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Soldati, G. 2023. Mineness, deflation, and transparency. In Self-experience: essays on inner awareness, eds. M. García-Carpintero, and M. Guillot. 99–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter  Google Scholar 

Spaulding, S. 2015. On direct social perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36: 472–482.

Article  Google Scholar 

Weiskrantz, L. 2009. Blindsight: a case study spanning 35 years and new developments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book  Google Scholar 

Westfall, M. 2021. Other minds are neither seen nor inferred. Synthese 198(12): 11977–11997.