Results

Between Oct 23, 2017, and Dec 5, 2017, the questionnaire was sent to 20 134 people and accessed by 3418 people, with 1131 people completing the questionnaire or a parallel carer's questionnaire, constituting a response rate of 5·61%. This rate was the combined response rate for both service users and carers, given that the total number of service users and carers among the target population was unknown. 50 completed service user questionnaires were excluded because of absence of consent or not meeting the diagnostic inclusion criteria. This exclusion left a study population of 932 service users with bipolar disorder, of whom 621 answered the free-text question about self-binding directives. After data quality checks, 56 (9%) of the 621 responses were excluded, leaving a dataset of 565 service user responses, divided into endorsement, ambivalence, and rejection groups. Response rates for the free-text question were high among participants who endorsed (463 [64%] of 719 responders) and rejected (65 [72%] of 90 responders), but lower among those who were ambivalent (37 [31%] of 120 responders).

565 (61%) of the 932 participants provided reasons behind their answers to the closed question about endorsement of the self-binding directives concept. These participants had self-identified as having a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and were predominantly white British, women, and well educated (table 1). Many respondents had lived experience of severe illness and treatment for which self-binding directives would apply. A majority (352 [62%]) reported at least one episode of hospitalisation, a third (193 [34%]) reported at least one experience of formal involuntary detention, and many mentioned experiences of mania, psychosis, and suicidality. The proportion of respondents reporting hospitalisation experiences within the endorsement, ambivalence, and rejection groups was similar, with slightly higher rates of previous detention among those who endorsed or were ambivalent than among those who rejected the idea of self-binding statements. The distribution of hospitalisation rates was 291 (63%) of 463 respondents in the endorsement group, 24 (65%) of 37 respondents in the ambivalence group, and 37 (57%) of 65 respondents in the rejection group. For detention rates it was 165 (36%) of 463 respondents in the endorsement group, 12 (32%) of 37 respondents in the ambivalence group, and 16 (25%) of 65 respondents in the rejection group.

Table 1Demographical details of the survey population

Data are n or mean (SD). GCSE=General Certificate of Secondary Education (in the UK except Scotland).

Although 463 (82%) of the 565 participants endorsed self-binding directives, support was not unanimous, with 37 (7%) participants being ambivalent and 65 (12%) rejecting (table 2). Five clear themes concerning reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection emerged. Reasons for endorsing self-binding directives were classified into two themes: distorted thinking when unwell and benefits. Reasons for rejecting or questioning self-binding directives were classified into three themes: logistical concerns relating to drafting and implementation, valid thinking when unwell, and harms. Both the benefits and harms themes were subdivided into conceptual and practical subthemes, to differentiate between outcomes such as increased or decreased empowerment (conceptual) and reduced suicide risk (practical).

Table 2Distribution of themes and subthemes within response groups

Given that many individual responses contained multiple themes, the total percentages for distribution of themes within each group exceed 100%.

The most striking result was the predominance of the distorted thinking when unwell theme (table 2) and the remarkably varied articulations of this idea (panel; see appendix pp 1–23 for full dataset).PanelQuotations supporting themes and subthemes

Distorted thinking when unwell

•

“Being well and not being well are quite different states. Being not well puts one in a tricky place for making good decisions.” (endorsement group)

•

“I feel an individual's wishes should be respected although there is a point when an individual becomes too unwell and cannot make decisions for themselves.” (rejection group)

•

“If it has been planned during well periods then that is a true representation of wishes.” (endorsement group)

•

“You are unwell and lack capacity. I would agree with this statement looking back at when I was last sectioned but my views were very different at the time due to my illness. It is my well views and opinions that should be acted upon.” (endorsement group)

•

“I wouldn't have the capacity to make careful, reasoned judgements when unwell.” (endorsement group)

•

“When I am ill, I am not of the right mind. So making a decision at this time would probably not have a good outcome.” (endorsement group) or “I think this because when I'm unwell I would not be making the right decisions for myself and my wellbeing.” (endorsement group)

•

“I think that it should be respected as when I'm unwell I make unwise decisions.” (endorsement group)

•

“Whilst unwell it is very common to have ideas that are not in one's best interest.” (endorsement group)

•

“Because when I'm in a depressive state I want to die, when I'm not I don't. I'm a different person with different thoughts, feelings and reactions when I'm depressed or even manic, it wouldn't be fair if I'd stated in my care plan to persist in treatment to get better but was refused because of my depressed or manic state.” (endorsement group)

•

“Because psychosis intrinsically, temporarily, alters one's judgement.” (endorsement group)

•

“Because losing insight into one's illness and experiencing resistance to treatment are such key features of bipolar episodes for so many people, and lack of treatment at these points can lead to harmful behaviours if treatment is not imposed.” (endorsement group)

•

“Because when I am unwell I am irrational and unable to make healthy or safe decisions.” (endorsement group)

•

“During episodes you lose the objectivity that is present when well. It helps if such objectivity is self-binding during periods of illness, provided the circumstances have been foreseen.” (endorsement group)

•

“When psychotic or manic or depressed you can become another person and irrational. It is easy to make bad decisions when ill, that may not be in my best interest. You cannot have the lunatics running the asylum? Can we?” (endorsement group)

•

“When we have an episode of high or low mood, we are not ourselves. We do not think straight.” (endorsement group)

•

“When I am ill, all I see is the pain and torment of my existence, I want to die and any easy way would be seized upon and refusal of medication which I would do just cements these ideas. If I make a care plan whilst feeling normal I know I am far happier, contented and much more rational and l know that it would be bad for me and my family if I died. This is why I believe a care plan would work. At least then there is something in writing that I know is a true reflection of my life rather than the warped one my brain insists is true.” (endorsement group)

Conceptual benefits

•

“Gives people voices before they are ill and unable to make them.” (endorsement group)

•

“If it has been planned during well periods then that is a true representation of wishes.” (endorsement group)

Practical benefits

•

“When feeling and thinking clearly, you can agree to sensible ideas of what type of care you may need. However, during an episode—manic or depressive—you don't think the same and although you agreed certain things when well, it may be very difficult to deal with these decisions as they could be traumatic when unwell, even if they are there to help you get better.” (endorsement group)

•

“Because when I am unwell, my thoughts, perceptions and desires drastically change. I can become suicidal and impulsive, making decisions or plans that I (would) later regret (if I had followed through with them). I often come out of an episode feeling extraordinarily grateful that I didn't take my own life, but when I become ill the same thoughts and plans return to me regardless and I am convinced they are my true desires. I don't want anyone to listen to me when I am unwell, I explicitly would want them to take my advance plans as my true wishes and would be mortified if they were overruled.” (endorsement group)

Logistical concerns

•

“Could have changed between making and becoming so unwell, but not recorded...due to practicalities of life, and thus may not be true wishes.” (ambivalence group)

•

“Things change and sometimes it's difficult to guess what might happen in a hypothetical situation.” (ambivalence group)

•

“How do you know they were of fit mind when they wrote it? How do you know someone else has not befriended that person for financial gain?” (ambivalence group)

•

“It is hard to say. It depends how unwell you are in a particular circumstance. I have been unwell but still perfectly able to make my own decisions and on occasions I have been so unwell I've not been able to make my own decisions.” (ambivalence group)

•

“It's so hard with bipolar and my family are very controlling. I am afraid what could happen and knowing I were committed to it forever could be daunting.” (rejection group)

Valid thinking when unwell

•

“I am wary of being hospitalised when I am manic, because I do not feel that this is a destructive part of my illness: in fact, I enjoy it, am happy, productive, and move my life on in important ways, ways which I can't do in hospital. However, I am well aware that psychiatric professionals all see mania as very destructive, even though my most destructive behaviour is by far when I am severely depressed. So, I assume that a psychiatrist would probably attempt to get me to agree to hospitalisation or treatment for manic episodes as well as depressive, which I do not want, but could not convince a psychiatrist of.” (rejection group)

•

“Were I manic I might still have insight, were I psychotic probably not.” (ambivalence group)

Conceptual harms

•

“Not empowering or respectful.” (rejection group)

•

“Even when I'm mad, I'm still a human and have the right to make decisions even if they are bad ones.” (rejection group)

Practical harms

•

“If a person says they wanted to stay home to be treated but are clearly a danger to themselves or others, hospital and care is the best place.” (rejection group)

•

“It depends how ill you are. Docs sometimes have to make decisions in difficult circumstances in order to help you. A self-binding statement could get in the way. Then there is the question of legal responsibility and liability.” (ambivalence group)

A key reason for endorsing self-binding directives was the theme of distorted thinking when unwell. This theme appeared in nearly all endorsements (411 [89%] of the 463 endorsements), and even within some rejection and ambivalence responses. The term distorted, used by a few participants, was chosen for this theme's name, to capture the central idea of adverse change in thought processes, without the distinct judgment conveyed by terms such as invalid. This adverse change was presented as a substantial alteration from valid thinking when well and was generally described as a determinate shift that substantially compromised decision-making abilities. A response example from the endorsement group was: “A person going through a manic episode has, by definition, seriously distorted thinking. If a person is manic to the extent that they cannot make their own decisions then again, by definition, they are not in a right mind to refute their advance care plan—otherwise it's basically worthless.”

Thought processes when well were presented as valid or authentic, either explicitly or implicitly. Participants linked this idea to using lived experience of previous episodes of severe illness to understand both the effect of distorted thinking when unwell on decision-making abilities and how to manage future episodes. Many respondents stated explicitly that the breakdown of decision-making abilities justifies overruling their treatment decisions “during an episode of illness”. Some of the free-text answers referred to outcomes of decision making, rather than simply the process, and used language clearly implying value judgments, such as best, right, good, or wise decision. The effect on decision-making ability and outcomes was expressed with great variety, ranging from the appearance of directly evoking medicolegal terminology associated with decision-making capacity to using far less technical language.

Many participants used diagnostic terms like mania, psychosis, and depression when explaining the distorted thinking and shift from valid to distorted thinking when becoming unwell, whereas others used the concept from psychiatry of lack of insight into one's illness. Many responses conveyed distortion through stark descriptions of so-called irrationality, using highly emotive and even stigmatising language. Such responses might represent a deliberately hyperbolic attempt to distance themselves from their so-called ill self—a distancing also expressed by presenting distortion as a fundamental change of identity.

Some respondents presented the benefits (theme) of self-binding directives as a reason for endorsing their use and suggest potential positive outcomes. 36 (8%) of the 463 participants who endorsed the use of such directives mentioned conceptual benefits (subtheme) as a justification, such as increased empowerment, autonomy, authenticity, and rights, and there was substantial overlap with the theme of distorted thinking when unwell. For example, one response from the endorsement group was “I use it myself. I give mental health staff permission to section me if needed. It gives back the power to me.”

58 (13%) of the 463 participants who endorsed the use of self-binding directives suggested that these directives might bring them potential practical benefits (subtheme of benefits), including ensuring treatment, minimising risk, and collaboration in, and continuity of, care. One example response from the endorsement group was: “When you are in either a manic or depressive episode you are more likely to stop people helping and just want to push away any help.” Some respondents described the cost–benefit analysis of weighing the consequences of not receiving treatment against the probable trauma of experiencing involuntary treatment (panel; appendix pp 8, 18). Eight participants explicitly presented self-binding directives as a way to reduce suicide risk. Some free-text answers were quite closely connected to the theme of distorted thinking when unwell.

A small group of participants rejected self-binding directives (65 [12%] of 565 participants) or were ambivalent about their use (37 [7%] of 565 participants), expressing doubts about the viability of such directives and the prospect of potential harms, which often directly conflicted with reasons given for endorsement.

The theme of logistical concerns about the drafting and implementation of self-binding directives was the most prevalent among participants who gave ambivalent (36 [97%] of 37 participants) and rejection responses (33 [51%] of 65 participants), and also appeared in responses of participants who endorsed the use of self-binding directives (63 [14%] of 463 participants). Many participants expressed concerns about the criteria for valid advance decision making, such as being properly informed. A common concern was that the self-binding directive would become out of date, as illustrated in a response in the rejection group: “A plan that is written when I am well is a good idea BUT I may have changed my mind about things and not updated the original plan.” Some respondents worried about the applicability of the self-binding directive to later circumstances, when they are unwell. Seven worried about ensuring decision-making capacity at the time the directive was completed. Six participants from the ambivalence or rejection groups, along with six participants from the endorsement group, voiced concerns about ensuring that decision-making capacity for treatment was definitely impaired at the time of implementation. Four participants expressed concern about undue influence from family, clinicians, or others.

The theme of valid thinking when unwell was given as a reason for rejecting self-binding directives by 26 (40%) of the 65 participants who rejected the use of such directives; the term “valid” was used in several responses and thus was incorporated in the theme name. The idea of valid thinking when unwell seemed to directly challenge the theme of distortion of thinking when unwell. An example from the rejection group was: “I think how a person is feeling in a crisis is valid. As it's valid at the time, the advanced statement might be temporarily invalid.” One powerful statement presented mania as a valid and positive dimension of the participant's life, contrary to the usual psychiatric evaluation. Another concern was that valid thinking might persist through some severe illness states, but not others, whereas the self-binding directive would apply during all. A small proportion (five [14%] of 37 participants) who gave ambivalent responses and even a few of those who endorsed the use of self-binding directives (seven [2%] of 463 participants) shared these valid thinking reservations, without being convinced by them, illustrating the complexities of the cost–benefit analysis.

Some respondents presented the potential harms (theme) of self-binding directives as a reason for rejection or ambivalence regarding the use of self-binding directives, suggesting that the use of such directives could have damaging outcomes. 26 (40%) of the 65 participants who rejected the use and seven (19%) of the 37 participants who were ambivalent raised concerns about conceptual harms (subtheme), presenting a distinct idea: that, although thought processes might change when a person is unwell, this alteration does not necessarily render the thought processes invalid; therefore, to overrule decisions at this point risks contravening human rights. Many participants connected this idea with that of valid thinking, inverting the distorted thinking and conceptual benefits theme. Some participants used terms such as “mad” almost ironically, suggesting that decisions made when unwell might be contrary to an individual's best interests, but still valid and worthy of respect. Others presented self-binding directives as threatening autonomy, self-respect, and civil liberties, in direct opposition to those who endorsed them as having the potential to enhance these very values. An example response from the rejection group was: “Being unwell does not necessarily mean that you are unable to make a decision that is not right for you. Considering what is best for someone is subjective and it would be against one's human rights to not allow someone to change their mind about what is happening in a specific situation when a plan is made on what to do in a hypothetical one.”

The small number of participants who rejected the use of self-binding directives on the basis of concerns about potential practical harms (subtheme) provided a contrast to those who gave responses about the conceptual harm (subtheme), insofar as most supported clinical judgment taking precedence when a person was unwell. These participants worried that treatment instructions in self-binding directives might be misguided, inappropriate for the circumstances, or even directly harmful, and might then hamper clinical decision making. Similar concerns were found within the responses of participants who were ambivalent about the use of self-binding directives; in their responses, concerns about practical harm marginally outweighed concerns about conceptual harm. Nevertheless, one response clearly questioned psychiatric viewpoints and rejected self-binding directives as potentially removing the benefits of mania. A typical example from the rejection group about the practical harms subtheme was: “I trust clinicians to be bound by their duty to treat me according to the immediate and presenting symptoms, not some guess made the previous year. They medicate, care, and where possible seek insight from friends and family. Sad fact, bipolar disorder can smash up the world and leave one picking up the pieces at a later time. So too can a broken back or shattered knees. Help me face the daunting haul back to autonomy following an episode, not shackle and fetter me with red tape.”

DiscussionPeople with bipolar disorder gave clear, rich, and varied responses describing their opinions regarding the use of self-binding directives. This empirical evidence supports the view that mental health law and practice should be adapted to accommodate a feasible self-binding directive model1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination., 2Making the case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute., 3Self-binding directives for mental health treatment: when advance consent is not effective consent. and, more generally, that we cannot define the successful outcomes of advance decision making in mental health purely in terms of avoidance of involuntary and inpatient treatment.12Stephenson LA Gergel T Gieselmann A et al.Advance decision making in bipolar: a systematic review., 16Stephenson LA Gergel T Ruck Keene A Rifkin L Owen G The PACT advance decision-making template: preparing for Mental Health Act reforms with co-production, focus groups and consultation. Yet, despite overall predominance of endorsement of the use of self-binding directives, the presence of clear rejections and ambivalence was based on varied concerns, such as logistics, or endangering autonomy, capacity, and clinical judgment, emphasising the need to take individual values and opinions into account. Such rejections and ambivalence certainly show that endorsement of the use of self-binding directives is not unanimous among people with bipolar disorder and that there are concerns that need to be addressed.Self-binding directives are conventionally justified in terms of minimising risk by ensuring swifter access to treatment.1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination., 2Making the case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute., 3Self-binding directives for mental health treatment: when advance consent is not effective consent., 5Ulysses directives in The Netherlands: opinions of psychiatrists and clients., 17Gremmen I Widdershoven G Beekman A Zuijderhoudt R Sevenhuijsen S Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry: a matter of good care?., 18Berghmans R van der Zanden M Choosing to limit choice: self-binding directives in Dutch mental health care., 19Ulysses contracts in psychiatric care: helping patients to protect themselves from spiralling. However, the dominant justification given for the use of self-binding directives was the theme of distorted thinking when unwell and the resultant impairments of decision-making abilities, rather than risk avoidance. This dominance is all the more striking, given that all survey participants resided in countries where mental health laws are based on assessment of mental disorder and risk, rather than decision-making capacity. This finding might provide support for the enactment of so-called fusion proposals, in which mental health laws are based on impairments of decision-making capacity, rather than risk. Some statements supporting the use of self-binding directives did present minimisation of risk as a justification, particularly suicide risk. The possibility of such risk reduction might be a powerful argument for the use of self-binding directives, given that it is estimated that “about one-third to one-half of bipolar patients attempt suicide at least once in their lifetime and approximately 15–20% die due to suicide”.21Bipolar disorder and suicide: a review.Participants presented distorted thinking when unwell as a determinate, unwelcome, and uncontrollable shift from healthy, authentic, and rational cognitive processes of decision making. This description contrasts with the commonly expressed fear that a self-binding directive might be implemented before the individual's decision-making capacity for treatment is sufficiently impaired. This fear has been a primary factor hindering clinical and legal introduction of self-binding directives, insofar as it has led to either rejection of self-binding directives or the imposition of impracticable legal safeguards.1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination., 2Making the case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute., 3Self-binding directives for mental health treatment: when advance consent is not effective consent. Survey responses within the distorted thinking theme appeared to indicate widespread confidence that the transition to a severe state of illness would be accompanied by clear impairment of decision-making abilities concerning treatment. Concerns about early implementation of self-binding directives were presented as a reason for overall ambivalence or rejection of their use in only six responses.The survey responses also challenge various alternative models of self-binding directives that have been proposed by researchers to address this early implementation problem and have been summarised by Gergel and Owen.1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination. Most controversial is a competence insensitivity model, that would allow implementation of a self-binding directive regardless of the individual's decision-making capacity for treatment.1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination. Other models de-emphasise decision-making capacity in various ways. Some models view the self-binding directive as prioritising an individual's long-term values over those they hold when unwell;1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination. some propose risk, not decision-making capacity, as the criterion for implementation;22Ulysses in the United Kingdom: difficulties with a capacity-based justification for self-binding in bipolar disorder. and some adopt the idea that decision-making capacity varies by degrees, rather than there being a determinate threshold for implementation.19Ulysses contracts in psychiatric care: helping patients to protect themselves from spiralling. By contrast, most responses in our survey from service users with bipolar disorder, whether they individually endorsed or rejected the use of self-binding directives, appeared to assume that impaired decision-making capacity for treatment was a prerequisite and the reason for implementation of a self-binding directive. Moreover, most of these responses appeared to imply the acceptance of the medicolegal notion of decision-making capacity as a threshold concept, when they presented distorted thinking as a distinct, determinate shift from healthy and unimpaired decision making.Concerns about vulnerability, often raised with respect to self-binding directives,1Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar affective disorder—self-binding directives and self-determination., 2Making the case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute. do not feature in the survey responses. Such concerns might reflect status-based assumptions about the inherent psychological and epistemic vulnerabilities of people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities by those without lived experience of such conditions.23Vulnerability of individuals with mental disorders to epistemic injustice in both clinical and social domains., 24Testimonial injustice and vulnerability: a qualitative analysis of participation in the court of protection. For instance, respondents did not express any concerns about potential emotional distress from discussing disturbing memories and topics while drafting a self-binding directive, and concerns about undue influence, or about self-binding directives hampering clinical judgment, were raised in only 12 responses. Respondents appeared ready and able to articulate details about their illness and its effects on their thinking and decision making, and to understand these effects with great insight and clarity. Similar findings about the inapplicability of such concerns about vulnerability were reached in a more general study of advance decision making in mental health,8Priebe S Katsakou C Glöckner M et al.Patients' views of involuntary hospital admission after 1 and 3 months: prospective study in 11 European countries. and in studies suggesting that people with bipolar disorder tend to have good insight and understanding of illness when in remission.25Ramachandran AS Ramanathan R Praharaj SK Kanradi H Sharma PSA A cross-sectional, comparative study of insight in schizophrenia and bipolar patients in remission., 26Mathew AJ Samuel B Jacob KS Perceptions of illness in self and in others among patients with bipolar disorder. The degree of understanding shown in responses in our survey challenges the view that poor insight, or inability or refusal to acknowledge and understand one's condition, and even lack of decision-making capacity for treatment, persist during remission in bipolar disorder, and could impede shared decision making.27Shared decision making is an ethical imperative., 28Malhi GS Lagopoulos J Das P Moss K Berk M Coulston CM A functional MRI study of Theory of Mind in euthymic bipolar disorder patients. Such a view is reflected, for example, in a Louisiana, USA, law requiring decision-making capacity to be formally certified by a clinician when a service user drafts an advance directive for treatment of mental, but not physical, health.2Making the case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute.Many survey respondents appeared to accept and articulate, either explicitly or implicitly, the experience of impaired decision-making capacity for treatment during severe episodes of bipolar disorder, with many including other psychiatric diagnostic categories and concepts sometimes considered controversial, including psychosis, delusions, and loss of insight. These respondents presented these experiences as constituting justifications for others to impose treatment decisions that can override their own treatment decisions while severely unwell. Such views could be seen to challenge human rights-based rejection of mental capacity assessment and involuntary treatment, and to help address some of the difficulties associated with the need to provide protection, while also respecting agency and autonomy. In particular, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has, in its General Comment No 1 (GC1), called for the abolition of both mental capacity assessment and involuntary treatment.10Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
General Comment 1 on Article 12: equal recognition before the law. However, the Committee also clearly supports advance decision making in its GC1, stating “all persons with disabilities have the right to engage in advance planning”,10Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
General Comment 1 on Article 12: equal recognition before the law. which has led countries such as India29The Mental Healthcare Act. and Australia (in some states and territories including the Australian Capital Territory) to incorporate advance decision making into their mental health laws.3Self-binding directives for mental health treatment: when advance consent is not effective consent., 31India's Mental Healthcare Act, 2017: content, context, controversy. In its commitment to promoting “individual autonomy”, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities presents mental capacity, defined as “the decision-making skills of a person”, as a flawed, “highly controversial” concept, which is “contingent on social and political contexts”.10Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
General Comment 1 on Article 12: equal recognition before the law. Furthermore, it argues that to deny any type of legal capacity, on the basis of impaired decision-making capacity, is inherently discriminatory and contravenes the individual's core right to “equal recognition before the law”.10Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
General Comment 1 on Article 12: equal recognition before the law.The position of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities would seem to remove the medicolegal foundations for both self-binding directives and advance decision making in general.32Adverse consequences of article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for persons with mental disabilities and an alternative way forward. More broadly, disagreements over whether coercive care can ever be justified have led to an impasse in the UN human rights system.33Surveying the Geneva impasse: coercive care and human rights. The results from our survey might help to circumvent such difficulties, if we view self-binding directives as a means to support, rather than prohibit, the exercise of legal capacity. Clearly, many service users with bipolar disorder have found that severe illness distorts their thinking and thereby renders them temporarily unable to exercise legal agency and autonomy. They wish, therefore, to exercise their autonomy and manage their condition through advance treatment decisions that can be followed during future severe episodes.A limitation of our study is generalisability, given that the survey was available only in English and the participants were predominantly white British, female, and well educated. The use of the UK mailing list as the sampling frame and a low response rate introduced further selection bias, as people with a previous awareness of or interest in advance decision making are likely to be over-represented and the survey was only accessible to those with the necessary digital resources.11Hindley G Stephenson LA Ruck Keene A Rifkin L Gergel T