This article sits at a point of intersection between the philosophy of physics and the metaphysics of modality. There are clear similarities between Everettian quantum mechanics and various modal metaphysical theories, but there have hitherto been few attempts at exploring how the two topics relate. In this article, I build on a series of recent papers by Wilson ([2011], [2012], [2013]), who argues that Everettian quantum mechanics’ connections with traditional modal metaphysics are vital in defending it against objections. I show that Wilson’s preferred version of Everettian quantum mechanics has two problems. First, it is unable to account for the contingency of various intuitively contingent modal claims. Second, it fails to yield intuitive truth values on modal claims about the number of branches in a given Everettian multiverse. Since modal claims about branch number are instrumental in decision-theoretic solutions to Everettian quantum mechanics’ problem(s) with probability, this second problem has wider dialectical implications. I suggest amendments to the underlying metaphysics that overcome these problems. The result is a more robust version of Everettian quantum mechanics.