I am grateful to James Cordeiro, Timothy Murphy, Heloise Robinson and Teresa Baron for their perceptive and stimulating comments on my article in this journal.1 In what follows, I seek to respond to some of the main points raised in each commentary.

Cordeiro examines the implications of various forms of ectogestation for the gestational versus moral parenthood debate by contrasting it with in vivo (natural) gestation.2 His analysis considers the gestating mother’s and biological father’s parenthood claims in light of various outcomes and the burdens and harms ectogestation may impose on them and on the fetus and newborn. I think his analysis helps to illustrate that—even if gestation does not necessarily give rise to a non-instrumentally valuable good in the form of an intimate relationship—corresponding pro tanto claims to moral parenthood might be settled by appeal to harms of ectogestation itself or voluntaristic considerations.

Murphy explores the implications of my argument for parental duties.3 His main claim is that if we accept scepticism as to the existence of any non-instrumentally valuable good in the form of an intimate emotional relationship between a gestator and the newborn, it is unclear why the gestator would have any particular duty to the child on the basis of such a good. I am in overall agreement with Murphy’s observation on this point. I take his argument to show that even though gestationalist accounts, under this …