In his essay on paternalism and personal identity, Wilkinson draws on Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons (1984) to call for a reappraisal of the role of paternalism in healthcare decision-making in situations in which patients with capacity make decisions which are likely to have harmful consequences for themselves.1 The imperative to respect autonomy, coupled with JS Mill’s insistence that the state is justified in interfering with an individual’s liberty only in situations in which she harms or threatens to harm another person, leaves clinicians with little room to constrain decisions in which a patient’s choice may seriously harm her. Parfit reduces personal identity to the continuity of psychological and physical traits across the lifecourse, and suggests that, since these sets of characteristics change significantly over time, it may make more sense to view a person at different time points as different ‘selves’, rather than as the same person. Parfit’s defence of paternalism involves arguing that, given this inevitable lack of continuity, causing harm to one’s future self is analogous to harming another person and that intervening to prevent this may be justifiable in accordance with the Harm Principle.2

The issue of personal identity has received considerable attention in the philosophical literature and it remains a vexed question. Parfit’s argument, along with the thought experiments on …