According to the available literature on judgment and decision-making, individuals are characterized by a tendency toward either maximizing or satisficing [1,2,3,4,5].Maximizing represents the search for the best option, whereas satisficing is the search for a satisfactory, or good enough, option [6,7]. For example, in a decision about which hospital to choose for a surgery, typical maximizers, in the attempt to make the perfect choice, would engage in an exhaustive comparison of all the available hospitals to find the one that is best in all respects. Typical satisficers, instead, would evaluate only a few hospitals and then would select the first one that meets their threshold of acceptability [8].Recent research on the maximizing/satisficing tendency has shown that maximizers are more normative decision-makers than Ref [9], see also [10]. Specifically, maximizers seem to be less susceptible to some cognitive biases, such as the framing effect, the base-rate fallacy, and the sunk-cost bias. The framing effect is the influence on the answers to a decision problem by the specific way in which the decision problem is framed or presented [11]. For example, individuals prefer to buy beef described as 75% lean compared to beef described as 25% fat [12]. Misuraca et al [9], found this effect weaker in individuals high in maximizing compared to individuals low in maximizing and attributed this finding to the greater numeracy ability of maximizers which would allow them to better process numerical information [13,14]. The base-rate fallacy consists in an error in probability judgments produced by the neglect of some crucial numerical information, and by the consideration of some unimportant descriptive information in the judgment task [15]. For example, in a task asking the probability that a randomly selected person from a group of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers is an engineer, individuals tend to judge with a higher probability that the person in an engineer rather than a lawyer if the person is described with characteristics typically associated to engineers. In other words, individuals’ answers are based on unimportant descriptive information about the person, and do not instead take into consideration the proportion of engineers and lawyers in the group from which the person is randomly drawn. Misuraca et al. [9] found this effect being stronger among individuals low in maximizing, as a consequence of maximizers’ greater ability to make judgments in accordance with the normative rules of statistical prediction. Finally, the sunk-cost bias is the tendency to pursue a suboptimal alternative merely because one has already invested money, effort, or time in it ([16], see also [17]). For example, if a person already paid for a dessert, the person tends to eat it even though they are totally full. Misuraca et al. [9] observed that individuals high in maximizing were less susceptible to the sunk-cost bias compared to individuals low in maximizing. Building on the above findings showing that individuals high in maximizing are more normative decision-makers than individuals low in maximizing, the aim of this paper is to further investigate the normative skills of maximizers. In particular, we extended the effect found by Misuraca et al. [9] to another well-established cognitive bias: the frequency vs. percentage format effect ([18,19,20,21,22,23]; see also [24]). In line with the assumption that maximizers have superior decision-making skills [9], we hypothesize that individuals high in maximizing are less susceptible to the effect of the specific format (frequency vs. percentage) of the task than individuals low in maximizing.