The article traces the hypotheses of the contemporary French psychiatrist Henri Grivois, concerning what he calls nascent psychosis. In a perspective close to descriptive phenomenology, Grivois tries to identify the alteration of subjective experience specific to the first moments of a psychosis. He thus describes the experiences of concernment and centrality as consisting in a disruption of the tacit mechanisms of mimesis and interindividual attunement. Using the common points between Grivois’s aim and that of the phenomenological approach, the article puts these two conceptions of first-episode psychosis into dialog, questioning in particular the prereflexive register of experience. The notion of centrality questions the conditions of the constitution of intersubjectivity: it places the question of the bodily and gestural incarnation that founds the relationship to the other at the center of our understanding of psychosis. Grivois’s hypotheses and the phenomenology of psychoses together contribute to the questioning of the therapeutic methods employed in the early stages of treatment. Centrality, in particular, questions the limits of verbal descriptions of psychotic experiences and invites us to think about methods that are based more on the anchoring and bodily attunement of the patient and the therapist.

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Introduction

In the course of his practice in a Parisian psychiatric emergency room, psychiatrist Henri Grivois developed, over the last 30 years, a substantial body of work focused on the original notion of “nascent psychosis” [1-4]. This notion was forged in parallel with the surge of work devoted to first-episode psychosis in contemporary psychiatry [5-7] but remains clearly distinguishable from it. Nascent psychosis does not correspond to a syndrome whose signs could be identified from a 3rd person perspective. Instead, it is a notion based on a critique of psychiatric semiologies and classifications and which suggests that the specificity of first-episode psychosis lies in a particular form of subjective experience.

Grivois describes the clinical specificity of these first moments of a psychosis with reference to two particular alterations in the subject’s experience, which he calls concernment and centrality. Concernment designates a diffuse experience in which the subject feels concerned by the presence of others and has the feeling that people are linked together by elusive connections. Centrality emerges as an extreme modality and a generalization of this experience of concernment in which the subject has the impression of being at the center of a crowd whose movements converge toward him or her.

Grivois claimed an approach based on a descriptive phenomenology [8], just as the EASE scale for exploring psychotic experiences refers to the experience of centrality [9]. However, in spite of these proximities between Grivois’s work and the phenomenological approach, the notion of nascent psychosis finds little echo today in the field of psychopathology.

Nevertheless, the clinical analyses proposed by Grivois contain fruitful possibilities for a dialog with the current phenomenological approach to the psychoses. The experiences of concernment and centrality invite us, in particular, to question the place of intersubjectivity in the development of a psychosis: they question the tacit conditions of possibility of this experience of intersubjectivity, as well as the subjective upheavals engendered when these tacit mechanisms are altered and transformed into explicit experience.

After a brief presentation of Grivois’s hypotheses, we will explore similarities and differences with the phenomenological approach and with the conceptions of a minimal self in schizophrenia [10, 11]. Then, we will question the implications of the experience of centrality in the therapeutic encounter between the patient and the clinician.

An Original Approach to First-Episode Psychosis

Grivois chooses to use the term nascent psychosis, rather than the term first-episode psychosis characteristic of studies dealing with subjects at ultra-high risk of psychosis and with the early detection of schizophrenia. The expression “nascent psychosis” seeks to take into account both the often-elusive aspect of these first moments of a psychosis and their dynamic logic; these initial sequences often go unnoticed by doctors and patients, but they alone allow us to grasp the logic of the development of psychotic symptoms and in particular, the logic of the development of delusions [12].

Nascent Psychosis, beyond the Scope of Psychiatric Semiologies

The notion of nascent psychosis is based on a critique of the semiology and nosography of psychoses used in classical psychiatry. The classification of different types of psychosis (paranoia, schizophrenia), of different delusional mechanisms (intuitive, interpretative, imaginative), and of different alterations of experience (derealization, depersonalization, ideas of reference) have, according to Grivois, produced a clinical fragmentation that makes it impossible to grasp the emergence of a psychosis as a single, unitary experience [12]. Grivois thus defends the hypothesis that there is an initial alteration of subjective experience common to all forms of psychosis. Situated beyond nosographic classifications, this initial experience would then evolve according to one of the different forms of psychosis and the subjective reactions that it may entail [2].

Contrary to certain contemporary psychiatric conceptions of early psychosis, which associate the latter with attenuated psychotic symptoms [13, 14], Grivois seeks to grasp the birth of these symptoms, before the stage at which they become fully constituted as delusions, hallucinations, or disorganization. This nascent and subjective form of psychosis is particularly difficult to describe, for patients as well as for clinicians. Grivois thus understands the proliferation of semiological terms seeking to identify and classify the signs of nascent psychosis as a defense mechanism on the part of psychiatrists, faced with the often-unspeakable strangeness of these pivotal moments [12].

Although Grivois does not belong to the current of phenomenological psychiatry, he does claim a phenomenological type of approach in his aim to grasp the qualitative and subjective specificities of nascent psychosis and to shed light on their role in the subsequent logic of the unfolding of symptoms: “From the concept of concernment, I propose a phenomenological morphogenesis of the initial sequence of psychosis” ([8], p. 104). According to Grivois, any nascent psychosis, regardless of its subsequent evolution, is articulated around two experiences that radically modify the subject’s relationship to the surrounding world and to intersubjectivity, which he calls concernment and centrality. These two disturbances of the relationship to the world, pathognomonic of nascent psychosis, thus play a role close to what Minkowski calls the generating disorder of schizophrenia [15].

Concernment and Centrality

The very earliest experience of psychosis would be that of concernment, which is then amplified and generalized in an experience of centrality. In Grivois’s writings, concernment refers to an experience that happens to everyone in a normal way, whereby a subject experiences the relations of reciprocity and mimicry that govern intersubjective relations. In psychosis, this concernment would be amplified and would become conscious, leading to experiences of varying degrees, the most extreme of which is the experience of centrality: here, the subject experiences himself as the object of everyone’s attention and perceives the movement of others as that of a synchronized and coordinated crowd.

These experiences would form the unique foundation of any psychosis. They should not be reduced to ideas of reference, which would rather correspond to any one of their possible crystallizations at a later stage, nor should they be confused with delusion, which is only one of their potential evolutions; concernment and centrality can also evolve toward nondelusional psychoses or even regress and not give rise to a chronic psychosis.

The term “concernment” was coined by the psychiatrist and literary critic Starobinski in relation to Rousseau’s experiences of persecution [16]. Grivois’s innovation is to relate this experience to a disruption of the immediate and implicit experience of what he calls interindividuality. Basing himself on the works of the anthropologist René Girard [17], Grivois supposes that intersubjectivity is constituted by infra-conscious mimetic relations between the subject and others, which take the form of prompting and motor resonance: “From the most insignificant to the most elaborate, simultaneous, connected, or deferred, our gestures do not cease to be used as prompting and reference to other individuals” ([3], p. 48). In normal experience, concernment remains implicit. It is based on infra-conscious mechanisms of imitation and identification, which form the basis of the coordination of movements and actions with others and the phenomena of contagion.

In the experience of concernment specific to psychosis, a disruption and a surge of these infra-conscious mechanisms of reciprocity and mimicry would occur, which would then become conscious for the subject and would be exacerbated in a hypermimesis. The movement is then experienced as indeterminate in its origin, and the subject can attribute it neither to himself nor to the other. The subject would then have the strange experience of a synchronization of his movements or intentions with those of others – an experience of a similarity or an indifference that perplexes him. The subject has the impression that there is an extraordinary coordination and connection between himself and others, one that must be explained by a particular signification.

This feeling of motor resonance with others is then likely to be generalized in an experience of centrality, in which the subject has the feeling of standing among the others as if in the middle of a coordinated crowd, from which he or she can feel like the center, like the leader or, on the contrary, like the scapegoat who is excluded. Centrality proves to be an intrinsically contradictory experience for patients, in which the subject feels they themselves initiate the movement of others, while also being potentially annihilated by their presence. One of the patients met by Grivois declares thus: “I am the personality of billions of human beings, men, women, children. One is nothing […] and one becomes everyone.” ([1], p. 124). Centrality is thus a basic disruption of intersubjectivity that can lead to a delusional belief in an exceptional position or mission, as well as to a persecutory delusion. The experience of centrality can give rise to the feeling of being solicited by the movement of others and of being passively submitted to them: “A gesture, a simple step backwards or forwards for example, keeps its nature of movement in space but loses its usual neutrality because nothing is indifferent from now on in relation to the others” ([3], p. 128).

According to Grivois, this experience of centrality can account for the fact that psychoses are very frequently triggered during adolescence: it would indeed be a period in which the construction of the subject’s identity, the importance of belonging to groups, and at the same time, the demand for singularity make the exacerbation of the experiences of mimesis and reciprocity particularly favorable [3]. The hypothesis that there is a disruption of motor resonance mechanisms also echoes Jeannerod’s work on shared motor representations [18] and neurocognitive work on disorders of agency in schizophrenia [19]. The alteration of these infra-conscious motor exchanges with others is indeed likely to produce experiences of indifferentiation, as well as uncertainty as to the origin of the movements or intentions perceived or carried out. According to Grivois, centrality is thus at the root of experiences of derealization, depersonalization, as well as the feeling of significance that leads to delusional interpretations. The development of a delusion would aim, for the subject, at verbalizing this enigmatic experience of centrality and at giving it meaning.

Dialog with Phenomenological Psychopathology

While contemporary work in phenomenology seeks to explore the diversity of the alterations of experience in early psychosis [20], Grivois suggests that the roots of these experiences lie in a more original experience of concernment and centrality. For this reason, Grivois was criticized for reducing the phenomenology of nascent psychosis to a single experience and for not taking into account the highly varied and polymorphic character of the first psychotic experiences [21]. On this point, there is a significant gap between Grivois’s approach and current work in phenomenological psychopathology on psychosis. Grivois defends a broad and unitary conception of psychosis, in which all forms of psychosis, including their manic and melancholic forms, would have their roots in the same deregulation of concernment. Conversely, the experiences explored in phenomenology by the EASE and EAWE scales seek to identify anomalies of the self that would be specific to disorders of the schizophrenia spectrum; they aim to differentiate the beginnings of schizophrenia from the alterations of experience present in mania or in psychotic depression, in particular [22].

While this gap must be kept in mind, it nevertheless seems to us that this hypothesis of a unique original experience is also what invites a dialog with phenomenological psychopathology. Close to the role that Minkowski confers on autism as a generating disorder of schizophrenia, centrality allows Grivois to examine the conditions for the constitution of the implicit experience of intersubjectivity and the place of the subject in the world. Although Grivois does not subscribe to a transcendental phenomenology, centrality can be questioned from the point of view of the prereflexive register of experience and the impairment of the minimal self.

Centrality as Loss of a Prereflexive Horizon?

Centrality is in some ways similar to what some authors in phenomenology refer to as a disorder of the minimal or basic self, i.e., the prereflexive dimension of the sense of self, which has as its correlate the development of hyperreflexivity in schizophrenia [11]. The diminution of the basic sense of self results in the prereflexive dimensions of the sense of self, becoming the object of explicit attention and exaggerated awareness. In centrality, the infra-conscious mechanisms of resonance with others are deregulated, resulting in an impairment of the feelings of self-agency and myness that are essential for the minimal self. These mechanisms are then transformed into an explicit process, bringing about, like the phenomena of hyperreflexivity, a perplexity of the subject and a reification of his or her experience.

Sass [23] stresses that experiences of centrality are correlative to solipsism that he describes as characteristic of schizophrenic delusions: in this solipsistic attitude, only the subject’s experience is perceived as real, but due to the fact that the transcendental self has been impaired, the self cannot perceive itself as the subject of this experience. In a way that is very close to what Grivois describes in relation to centrality, Sass emphasizes that the subject oscillates between the impression of being equivalent to the whole and of being nonexistent. Like centrality, solipsism is a self-contradictory experience.

In a collaborative article written by Sirere, Grivois, and the French phenomenologist Jean Naudin [24], the authors propose to understand centrality as a disappearance of the neutral background of the world and of a common horizon. Indeed, if in centrality the subject feels himself to be at the same time himself and all the others around him, there is no more background of experience. As Raballo et al. [25] point out, the centrality described by Grivois is close in this sense to the descriptions of first-episode psychosis proposed by Klaus Conrad in his gestalt analysis. Centrality would correspond to the phase that Conrad [26] calls apophany, which corresponds to the nascent phase of the delusional experience, in which the subject attributes an excessive meaning to the elements of his perception. This is characterized in particular by the experience of anastrophe: the latter consists in an alteration of the structure of experience in which the subject loses the neutral reference system that allows him to perceive the world, others, and himself from different perspectives. He then has the feeling that the whole world revolves around him.

Following Binswanger’s work [27], Sirere, Naudin, and Grivois propose to understand centrality as a fourth form of failed existence – alongside distortion, mannerism, and presumption – one that would be specific to nascent psychosis. It would be a question here of an anthropological disproportion and more particularly of a spatial disproportion of Dasein. Centrality would then bring about an inversion of intentionality close to the one described by Binswanger: if the subject can no longer constitute the experience of the world, in the absence of an implicit horizon of his perception, it is the world that starts to aim at the subject from the outside. The subject then has the impression that the gestures and the words of the others are directly addressed to him.

The phenomenological approach can thus enrich Grivois’s analyses, by giving a transcendental foundation to his hypothesis of an alteration of the immediate experience of the world and of others. The prereflexive dimension of the experience also makes it possible to clarify the unspeakable and ungraspable character of the centrality underlined by Grivois; this experience would be difficult to describe in any other way than by metaphors because it is situated in a register of the experience which normally is not the object of a verbal and explicit perception and description.

One of the strengths of the notions of concernment and centrality proposed by Grivois seems to us to be that they place intersubjectivity at the heart of the first upheavals of psychosis. Grivois thus quotes a patient who declares: “Psychosis is something one catches from others and that is treated by others” ([28], p. 16). By making concernment a disruption of the implicit mechanisms of motor reciprocity with others, Grivois proposes a hypothesis about the constitution of what he calls interindividuality. Could this hypothesis of a tacit motor attunement with others enrich the phenomenological analyses of psychosis?

Mimesis and Intersubjectivity

The minimal self is anchored in intersubjectivity, on the basis of a common prereflexive horizon constituted by what Husserl calls passive syntheses [29]. The prereflexive horizon of experience is from the outset anchored in intersubjectivity insofar as the horizon of meaning of an object in the world also includes the perception of this object from the point of view of another. Empathy and imitation, rooted in the subjective experience of body and action, play a central role in Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity. But this relation to the other cannot be based entirely, in Husserl’s view, on an instinctive and immediate imitation of the movements of others: this relation to the other rests on the mediation of imaginative perception [30].

The prereflexive dimension of intersubjectivity cannot therefore be reduced, in Husserl’s view, to the motor dimension of mimesis. Yet, Grivois’s hypothesis carries the risk of such a reduction, insofar as Grivois affirms that these phenomena of motor resonance, in their basic dimension, are devoid of any meaning and of any social dimension. The phenomenological perspective understands, on the contrary, the prereflexive dimension of intersubjectivity as a horizon of meaning, constituted in passive syntheses by the sedimentation of shared significations, uses, and affordances. While phenomenological hypotheses on psychosis can be placed in dialog with work on the neurocognitive bases of agency, they cannot be reduced to a purely sensorimotor constitution of intersubjectivity.

Grivois’s hypothesis nevertheless allows us to draw attention to the bodily and relational dimension of the onset of psychosis. In spite of the gap between this conception and the phenomenological approach, it echoes, in certain aspects, the work of Merleau-Ponty on the bodily anchoring of the imagination and the opening up onto horizons of sense on the basis of the immediate and sensorial experience of the body [31]. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a constituent body: as the point of perspective of perception, it is the “mediator of a world” ([31], p. 180). Merleau-Ponty invites us to consider an intentionality proper to the body, in which bodily space and feeling are constituted through action. Movement is what gives a horizon of sense, insofar as the world constitutes the horizon of anticipation of a motor project. This background of movement includes in itself the perspective of the bodies and of the movements of others: it is thus based on an immediate and tacit interaction between the bodily presences of the subject and of others, which can be brought closer to the infra-conscious motor regulations evoked by Grivois.

But it is in its clinical implications that Grivois’s hypothesis seems to us to be strongest. It places the emphasis on phenomena that are very often observed in first-episode psychoses but that are rarely studied precisely: mimesis and transitivism, but also the strangeness of contact with others. Often mentioned in the phenomenological diagnosis of psychoses [15, 32], the latter can also refer to the loss of an immediate attunement between the subject’s bodily presence and that of others. Building on the work of Merleau-Ponty, the French phenomenologist Marc Richir suggests thinking the prereflexive dimension of intersubjectivity from a Stimmung understood as contagion or resonance, which permeates the intersubjective encounter anchored in the lived body [33, 34]. In Richir’s work, the Stimmung refers to an affective tonality that can neither be reduced to an act of consciousness nor to a characteristic of the perceived object but one that permeates experience without any clearly assignable origin: it is anchored in an embodied experience and cannot be translated into explicit representation [34]. Stimmung, as an opening to the world, is anchored in the register of passive syntheses as described by Husserl. Richir posits that this Stimmung refers to a mimesis that would be felt by contagion. This Stimmung refers to a mimesis that is not reducible to a mirror relation and to the reproduction of the identical but which constitutes the most unfigurable and most archaic register of intersubjectivity.

Richir understands the psychoses as an affliction that deprives the subject of his capacity of internal and active mimesis anchored in the body. This capacity then turns into a quasi-specular, caricatured, or mannered imitation, evoking there also the forms of the failed existence described by Binswanger. These formulations by Richir present similarities with Grivois’s hypothesis of hypermimesis. However, what seems important to us to underline in these hypotheses is their implications for thinking about the clinical specificities that the relationship to the other takes on in the therapeutic encounter, specifically in these moments of nascent psychosis. Grivois’s work stresses these therapeutic implications, and the dialog with phenomenology is also fruitful on this point.

The Logic of Nascent Psychosis and Its Therapeutic Implications

One of the important contributions of Grivois’s analyses is that he examines the onset of psychosis according to a dynamic logic. In contrast to works describing the prodromal phase of psychosis on the basis of overt psychotic symptoms, Grivois’s “nascent psychosis” seeks to shed light on the progressive and subjective development of these symptoms. Delusions and hallucinations, in particular, are understood by Grivois as crystallizations that arise after the emergence of concernment and centrality and that aim at expressing verbally and giving meaning to this upheaval of experience [1]. Such a dynamic understanding gives a crucial place to the subjective reactions, most often infra-conscious and involuntary, to one’s experiences of centrality. Grivois underlines in particular the important role played by the perplexity and the major anguish entailed by the experience of centrality, a role that is very seldom highlighted in phenomenologically inspired research.

Using detailed descriptions of clinical cases of adolescents in the early stages of psychosis, Grivois notes, in particular, that centrality, by making the subject lose all evidence of his place in the world and among others, places him in the unbearable feeling of an urgency to give meaning to these phenomena. The unspeakable and contradictory character of this experience, in which the subject feels simultaneously at the center of everyone’s attention and reduced to nothingness, pushes him or her to look for formulations which, in order to explain this experience as best as possible, will take on the delusional character of a revelation, a mission, or a supernatural machination [1]. In the same way, hallucinations are for Grivois a symptom that appears secondarily and that crystallizes the impossibility of distinguishing because of hypermimesis, who, whether the other or oneself, is at the origin of the words being pronounced [35].

Grivois thus assumes that at a certain moment of this phase of the onset of psychosis there is a breaking point, beyond which the logic of the surge of symptoms will make it very difficult to go back and avoid the setting in of the psychosis. Once the delusional explanation has been constructed, the phenomena of centrality tend to subside, but the rupture with common reality is already firmly established. The lesson that Grivois draws from his clinical experience is therefore that of the earliest possible therapeutic intervention. This is difficult to achieve on the one hand because patients often arrive at the hospital after the unfolding of centrality, when a first delusional episode occurs, and on the other hand because centrality lends itself very little to verbal description. The phenomenological approach invites us to mention an additional difficulty, which Grivois did not develop very much: the phenomena of hypermimesis, transitivism, and indifferentiation between the self and other are likely to be amplified by the proximity of the therapeutic encounter and to provoke in the subject experiences of intrusion, persecution, or even anxiety of annihilation.

According to Grivois, the aim of this early handling of nascent psychosis is to counteract the need to resort to delusional explanations of centrality. He recommends accompanying the subject in his verbalization of the experience of centrality, without seeking to reduce the strange and contradictory character of this experience. To do this, Grivois relates this experience to its basis of motor disruption, in such a way as to make it unnecessary for the subject to have recourse to delusional explanations [1]. The description of these experiences would thus have a therapeutic value, insofar as describing this experience would make it lose its character as an enigma that calls for a delusional explanation. It seems to us that there is a proximity here between Grivois’s approach and the recent phenomenological works devoted to the prodromal phase of psychosis in the affirmation of a therapeutic power of the description of these alterations of experience that are enigmatic and anxiety-provoking for the subject. Parnas and Handest, speaking of interviews with patients using the EASE scale, emphasize the “relief, when the patient realizes that his strange world of experience is not entirely unique or private since it seems familiar to the psychiatrist […]” ([36], p. 132). But the sharing of this experience between the patient and clinician would not aim solely at this type of relief: it would also aim at rendering the recourse to delirium unnecessary, by diminishing the strange, extraordinary, and enigmatic character of these experiences.

The need for an explanation of centrality is, according to Grivois, of vital importance for the patient. If we rephrase Grivois’s analyses in phenomenological terms, the delusion would be an attempt to make sense of the prereflexive alterations of the experience of intersubjectivity. It seems to us that Grivois’s hypotheses invite the phenomenological approach to analyze more precisely the particular type of anxiety, both vital and ontological, that arises from experiences of centrality and its role in the construction of the delusion. However, the phenomenological approach allows us to highlight two paradoxes in the therapeutic proposals formulated by Grivois: on the one hand, if the founding experience of psychosis is that of a disruption and loss of basic intersubjectivity, how can we confer a therapeutic power upon the intersubjectivity of the clinical encounter? And on the other hand, how can the description of these alterations of the prereflexive register by the clinician, who brings these alterations into a narrative and explicit register, respond to these prereflexive afflictions without reinforcing the phenomena of hyperreflexivity?

These questions, also formulated by the phenomenological approach [37] do not seem to us to be sufficiently taken into account in Grivois’s work. They invite us to examine more precisely the subjective implications of the experience of centrality in the space of the therapeutic encounter, as well as the form that the descriptions of these experiences can take. Englebert suggests that the gap between the impairments of the minimal self and the narrative register of the therapeutic encounter invites us to reflect on clinical practices that allow us to place the emphasis on the sharing of a common space without necessarily having recourse to an explicit description of the experience lived by the subject [37]. He therefore proposes the idea of a territorial self, one that is an intermediary between the minimal self and the narrative self and that is based on bodily interactions and relational attunement. Faced with the risk of an exacerbation of hyperreflexivity in the verbal elucidation of the patient’s experiences, the phenomenological approach can invite us to explore nonnarrative forms of these descriptions, based on mediations directly founded on the dimensions of the body, space, and movement, such as the one proposed by Pankow [38] using the practice of modeling. This type of mediation, based on other means of expression than language, can be relevant in view of the difficulty of verbally describing the prereflexive alterations of experience. Such clinical devices intervene as a mediating object between the patient and the clinician: they are thus likely to diminish the hypermimetic effects of the mirror relationship described by Richir and to return to the basis of the constitution of intersubjectivity using the figuration of bodily feelings and movement.

Conclusion

The major interest in first-episode psychosis over the last two decades is still ongoing and has made it crucial to consider the modalities of psychotherapeutic care specific to the particularity of the experiences of the onset of psychosis. Taking into account this central role of an alteration of the conditions of intersubjectivity in nascent psychoses seems particularly important in the present context in which, worldwide, the experience of confinements and a reduction of social relations are likely, especially in young subjects, to lead to forms of derealization and disturbance of intersubjective attunements.

Grivois’s work, which was very well known in France when it was published, is today less used in psychopathology and does not receive much attention in the international literature. His analyses of nascent psychosis, based on very detailed clinical case descriptions, seem to us to be nevertheless quite original and capable of dialoguing with neurocognitive work on agency and motor resonance as well as with the phenomenological approach to the prereflexive conditions of experience.

Grivois’s hypotheses invite us to further question the dynamic logic of the sequence of subjective experiences leading to overt psychotic symptoms, starting with the feelings of anxiety, perplexity, and vital urgency that they provoke in the subject. It seems to us that this notion of anxiety or vital urgency could be analyzed in greater depth and in a more enriching way in the field of phenomenology. Conversely, the phenomenological perspective allows us to address certain criticisms of Grivois’s work, such as the risk of reducing intersubjectivity to a purely motor component or the risk of amplifying hypermimesis in the therapeutic encounter. These questions open up the possibility of a more in-depth description of the subjective experiences of the early stages of psychosis and the creation of therapeutic methods that take into account the specificities of these experiences and their consequences for the clinical encounter.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Benjamin Farrow for the English translation of this article.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author has no conflicts of interest to declare.

Funding Sources

The paper was not funded.

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