It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy (high credences in truths, low credences in falsehoods) and verisimilitude (investing higher credence in worlds that are more similar to the actual world). Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function: gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster, you must be able to think of the value of verisimilitude as somehow built into the value of gradational-accuracy. Can this be done? In a recent article, Oddie has argued that it cannot, at least if we want the accuracy measure to be proper. I argue that it can.

4.  Oddie’s Constraint

5.  The Good

5.1.  Proximity over the disagreement metric (Result 1)

5.2.  Proximity over the magnitude metric (Result 2)

6.  The Bad and the Ugly (Result 3)

7.  Some More Good: The Role of Evenness of Distribution (Result 4)

8.  Some More Bad: Which Propositions to Privilege? (Result 5)

9.  Concluding Thoughts: Accuracy and Practical Value