Scholars have demonstrated a robust pattern of sex-differentiated, heterosexual mating preferences, in which men, relative to women, tend to prefer young and attractive partners, whereas women, relative to men, tend to prefer partners with good financial prospects (Buss, 1989; Lippa, 2009; Penke & Asendorpf, 2008; Schmitt, 2005; Walter et al., 2020). The cross-cultural stability of these mating preferences (e.g., Buss, 1989; Walter et al., 2020) is consistent with the assertion that they are the output of evolved psychological mechanisms that function to enhance reproductive fitness (Buss, 1989).

However, cross-cultural variability in mate preferences can also be expected as the output of an evolved psychological mechanism, particularly when the local ecology or culture influences the reproductive value that a particular trait conveys (Gangestad et al., 2006). In a demonstration of this, Malovicki-Yaffe et al. (2018) reported that, owing to a unique sociocultural context, Haredi women living in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in Israel care very little about the economic prospects of men and instead value partners who demonstrate deep religious devotion.

In the current research, we revisit this community with an understanding that particular sects have shifted toward modernization in recent years, altering the context presumed to drive the sex reversal in mate preferences. In Study 1, we seek to replicate key findings of Malovicki-Yaffe et al. (2018), but with a substantially larger and more religiously diverse sample. The increased variation in religious conservatism is used to examine whether mate preferences shift in tandem with the cultural shift in value placed on men's earning prospects vs. religious devotion. In Study 2 we examine how men and women earn power in the ultra-Orthodox community, testing the assumption that women prefer attributes that generate power for men.

Evolutionary theorizing argues that humans possess evolved psychological mechanisms whose function is to select mates that enhance reproductive fitness (Buss, 1989; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). Mate preferences can therefore be viewed as outputs of these mechanisms (Miller & Todd, 1998). Sex differences in mate preferences theoretically stem from the experience of different recurrent reproductive obstacles. For instance, differences in minimum obligatory parental investment may have facilitated the evolution of sex differences in parenting vs. mating effort (Trivers, 1972) and mate choice (Bjorklund & Shackelford, 1999; Shackelford & Goetz, 2009; Symons, 1979). Because women invest considerable physical and energetic resources to produce offspring (e.g., 9 months of gestation) and have a lower reproductive ceiling than men (Baker, 1963; Faddy et al., 1992; Morita & Tilly, 1999; Wood, 1989), they would have benefitted from securing long-term, committed relationships with men who can provide resources to them and their offspring (Geary et al., 2004). In contrast, men need only invest a small amount of time and energy (e.g., one copulation and ejaculate) to produce offspring and have a higher reproductive ceiling than women (Einon, 1998; Tuljapurkar et al., 2007; Zitzmann, 2013), and would have benefitted from acquiring numerous sexual opportunities with women of high reproductive value.

This perspective offers several predictions about sex differences in mate preferences: men will prioritize youth and physical attractiveness because these attributes indicate health, fertility, and reproductive value (Barber, 1995; Lassek & Gaulin, 2019), and women will prioritize social status because it provides access to contested resources (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden et al., 2011). It follows that men will possess stronger motivations for achieving social status (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005) and women will prioritize status-oriented characteristics (e.g., ambitiousness) and economic resource-related traits, but only if wealth signals social status in the local culture (Lippa, 2009; Penke & Asendorpf, 2008; Schmitt, 2005; Walter et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019).

Although the stability of sex differences in mate preferences across cultures has been used to support the argument that these are the outcomes of evolved psychological mechanisms (Buss, 1989), cross-cultural variability is not inconsistent with the assertion that the mechanisms are evolved. Rather, it is expected that cultural and ecological influences will shape the output of such mechanisms when they shift the reproductive value of a trait. For instance, in ecologies with a high parasite load or high mortality rates, the value of an attractive partner is likely to increase, given its value in signaling health and genetic quality, as well as alter the magnitude of the sex difference in mate preferences for attractiveness (Gangestad et al., 2006; Little et al., 2007; Pillsworth, 2008). Likewise, the degree to which one values the resource earning potential of a partner may vary as a function of cultural norms or ecological conditions that shift the relative contributions that men and women provide to their household, even producing a reversal of sex differences in mate preferences (e.g., Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2018).

The Haredi community of Israel embraces a uniquely insular ideology. Originating in the 18th century as a reaction to the European Enlightenment, the forebears of the Haredi movement sought to counteract the modernization of Judaism by segregating Jewish people from the rest of society so that they could adhere to a strict interpretation of Jewish law (Bacon, 1991; Feiner, 2011; Hildesheimer, 1994; Katz, 2000). This led to segregated residential neighborhoods, a separate school system, and distinct dress codes for ultra-Orthodox Jews (Friedman & Shilhav, 1986; Shilhav & Friedman, 1989; Stadler, 2002). In order to restore religious knowledge lost during the Holocaust and to reconnect Jewish people to traditional practices (Frankel, 1994; Leon, 2017; Malechi, 2017), a sociocultural agreement was made to create a “society of learners.” Men were asked to devote their lives to studying sacred Jewish texts (Brown, 2000; Friedman, 1991; Stadler, 2002), while their wives worked as the primary breadwinner (Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2018; Yaffe, 2020; Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2023; Stadler, 2009).

In contrast with secular Israeli society, wealth is not the primary means by which men gain power within the ultra-Orthodox community. Rather, men gain power and prestige via religious study and devotion. Malovicki-Yaffe et al. (2018) examined sex differences in mate preferences among Israeli Jews, finding that both Haredi and secular men have a stronger preference for younger, physically attractive partners, consistent with the findings of most studies on mate preferences (e.g., Walter et al., 2020). However, Haredi women preferred religious scholars as mates, whereas secular Jewish women preferred wealthier, more career-driven partners. In contrast to past findings, there was no sex difference on mate preference ratings for a partners' economic prospects among the ultra-Orthodox. Moreover, when asked to rank the importance of the economic prospects of a partner, men ranked this attribute as more important than women did. These findings sharply diverge from the widely documented sex difference in which women tend to prefer wealthier partners more than men do.

Although surprising, in the absence of status derived from wealth, it is consistent with evolutionary theorizing that women will instead be drawn to culturally-specific characteristics that provide reproductive benefits, such as those mediated by relationships with one's social network (Gangestad et al., 2006). Haredi women's strong preference for devout Torah scholars may serve this function, as such scholarship is expected to grant men elevated power in the ultra-Orthodox community. The status hierarchy in the ultra-Orthodox community is based on religious prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).

Haredi men ascend the social-status hierarchy via the demonstration of their excellence as a Torah scholar (Farkash, 2023). They are deeply valued and revered within the community because of their religious knowledge and ability to provide spiritual guidance. Whereas men who work have little influence in their community, Torah scholars—particularly those who become Rabbis, exert power via a disproportionately large influence on political and community decision-making [e.g., the decision of who to vote for in elections, the determination of social norms such as the use of the internet (Fader, 2017), matriculation to higher education (Chassida & Trachtengot, 2023), and dress standards (Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2023)]. Elite scholars can achieve a high degree of wealth via a financial support system that is akin to patrons supporting artists. The children of Torah scholars gain entry into prestigious schools, and boys showing strong promise as a Torah scholar are preferentially matched with girls from high-status families (Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2018). And although many Torah scholars may live in poverty, the community and state provide aid in various forms to these families to support their scholarship (Cohen, 2006). Despite the social and material benefits that the most prestigious scholars may accrue, the community does not overtly promote high personal and family status as an ideal, underscoring a complex interplay between spiritual aspirations and societal rewards.

Commitment to the sociocultural arrangement in which women work to enable men's religious scholarship has shifted among the ultra-Orthodox in recent years, owing to greater integration with secular communities and practices. Estimates indicate that Haredi people comprise 12.6% of Israel's population (Malach & Cahaner, 2020), with an average of 6.5 children per household (Israel Central Bureau. of Statistics, 2022) and a growth rate that outpaces the broader population (4% vs. 1.9% annually) (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This has necessitated that Haredim expand into more heterogeneous and secular communities (Hananel et al., 2022). An increase in internet adoption among community members also accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic, growing from 40% to 82% of the population (Malach et al., 2022). Consequently, the Haredi community has begun to diverge into subgroups characterized by varying degrees of modernity and materialism (Cahaner, 2020). These developments provide an opportunity on two fronts (1) the technological modernization of the Haredi community makes data collection via online survey methods possible, as opposed to the paper-and-pencil snowball sampling method used by Malovicki-Yaffe et al. (2018), (2) the increasing heterogeneity of the community enables the examination of how variation in religious conservatism influences mate preferences.

In the current research, we contend that the cultural norms, values, and social expectations within the Haredi community provide input into evolved mechanisms that function to regulate mate preferences by imposing a culturally specific route to obtaining social status, thereby altering perceptions of desirable characteristics in romantic partners. In Study 1 we seek to replicate past findings (Malovicki-Yaffe et al., 2018) in a larger and more diverse online sample of participants. Specifically, we hypothesize that Haredi men will prefer younger, physically attractive mates, whereas Haredi women will show less interest in the earning potential of prospective partners, and instead prefer mates of deep religious knowledge and devotion. Furthermore, we extend past work by testing the prediction that the reversal of sex differences in mate preferences for a partner's economic prospects will vary as a function of religious conservatism. That is, women's weaker preferences for men's earning potential documented by Malovicki-Yaffe et al. (2018) should primarily apply to those with the deepest conservative religious beliefs, as these individuals adhere most strongly to the sociocultural arrangement in which women act as breadwinner to enable their husband's full-time religious scholarship. Among the less conservative, the pattern of mate preferences is expected to shift in the direction of the standard effect in which women prioritize men's economic status more than men.

Study 2 seeks to validate the assumptions made about how men and women gain power in the ultra-Orthodox community – to corroborate the claim that women's preference for men's religious devotion still reflects a preference for high status men. In particular, it is expected that men's power in the community, and to a lesser extent the home, will stem from their Torah scholarship as opposed to their wealth. Despite playing a primary economic role, women's ability to make money is not expected to translate into power in the community or in the home, given that this social role functions as a means to an end for men's status striving.